This paper analyzes the growth and inequality tradeoff for a small open economy where agents differ in their initial endowments of capital stock and international bond-holdings. Our analysis focuses on the distributional impacts of different structural shocks through their effects on agents' relative wealth and their labor supply decisions. Supplementing the theoretical analysis with numerical simulations, we demonstrate that openness -access to an international capital market -has important consequences on the growth-inequality tradeoff. Specifically, the growth and distributional consequences of structural shocks depend crucially on whether the underlying heterogeneity originates with the initial endowment of domestic capital or foreign bonds. 
Introduction
The potential tradeoff between growth and inequality is one of the fundamental questions in economics, dating back to the seminal work of Kuznets (1955) . Despite the intensive research activity that this issue has generated, the nature of the relationship remains unresolved, with the empirical evidence being inconclusive. Early growth regressions by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , Persson and Tabellini (1994) , Perotti (1996) , and others, yield a negative growth-inequality relationship.
1 But more recent studies obtain a positive, or at least more ambiguous, relationship; see for example, Li and Zou (1998) , Forbes (2000) , and Barro (2000) . 2 From a theoretical perspective, this empirical controversy should not be surprising. Because an economy's growth rate and its income distribution are both endogenous equilibrium outcomes of the economic system, the income inequality-growth relationship -whether positive or negative -will reflect the underlying set of forces to which both are reacting. To understand these linkages it is necessary to examine the growth-inequality relationship using a structural approach, and we do so by employing a consistently specified general equilibrium growth model.
In a completely general setup, in which the equilibrium growth rate and income distribution are mutually dependent, their joint determination and the analysis of their relationship becomes intractable; see e.g. Sorger (2000) . In a series of papers, García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2006 Turnovsky ( , 2007 Turnovsky ( , 2008 exploit the fact that if the utility function is homogeneous in its relevant arguments, the aggregate economy can be summarized by a representative agent, as a result of which aggregate behavior becomes independent of the economy's distributional characteristics. 3 While knowledge of this feature dates back to Gorman (1953) , it assumes particular importance in the present context, since the implied recursive structure enables us to address distributional issues in a tractable way.
Moreover, the class of utility function for which this aggregation simplifies in this way includes the constant elasticity utility function that dominates contemporary growth theory.
Virtually the entire literature linking growth and inequality is restricted to a closed economy. This is a severe shortcoming, given the increasing openness characterizing most economies, and the additional dimensions that international transactions bring to both growth and the distribution of income. Accordingly, this paper addresses the issue of the growth-inequality relationship in the context of a small open economy. The model we employ is an open economy version of the Romer (1986) endogenous growth model, as developed by Turnovsky (1999) . One feature of this model is that, like the Romer model, the economy always lies on its balanced growth path. While this rules out the dynamics of income distribution, which are clearly important, it has the pedagogic advantage of highlighting the growth-inequality tradeoff in a lucid way. 4 In this model, the heterogeneity that is the source of the underlying inequality stems from agents' initial endowments of assets, which includes both internationally traded bonds as well as domestic capital. The key mechanism generating the endogenous distribution of income is the positive equilibrium relationship we derive between agents' relative wealth and their relative allocation of time to leisure. This relationship has a simple intuition. Wealthier agents have a lower marginal utility of wealth. They therefore choose to increase consumption of all goods including leisure, and reduce their labor supply. Given their relative capital endowments, this translates to an endogenously determined distribution of income.
Substantial empirical evidence documents the negative relationship between wealth and labor supply. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1993) find evidence to support the view that large inheritances decrease labor participation. Cheng and French (2000) and Coronado and Perozek (2003) use data from the stock market boom of the 1990s to study the effects of wealth on labor supply and retirement, finding a substantial negative effect on labor participation. Algan, Chéron, Hairault, and Langot (2003) use French data to analyze the effect of wealth on labor market transitions, and find a significant wealth effect on the extensive margin of labor supply. Overall, these studies and others provide compelling evidence in support of the wealth-leisure mechanism being emphasized in this paper.
Using this framework, we analyze the joint determination of the growth rate and inequality and consider how they respond to various structural changes, including an increase in productivity, an increase in savings (decrease in rate of time preference), and an increase in the foreign interest rate. The structural approach allows us to consider not just wealth and income inequality, but also welfare inequality. In doing so, we show how the impacts of these structural changes on the growthinequality tradeoff depend upon the underlying origin of the heterogeneity, i.e. whether it originates with the endowment of capital or bonds. We also demonstrate that the presence of adjustment costs to capital accumulation may drive a wedge between an agent's relative wealth standing and her relative income, depending again on the relative endowments of domestic capital and foreign bonds.
These findings highlight the relevance of international asset markets in understanding the growthinequality relationship, and how this tradeoff facing a small open economy may be dramatically different from that confronting a closed economy.
We should note, however, that by adapting the Romer model, we are ignoring other important elements relevant to the growth-income inequality relationship, most notably human capital and education. This aspect is emphasized by Galor and Zeira (1993) , Bénabou (1996b) , and Viaene and Zilcha (2003) , among others. By identifying agents' heterogeneity with their initial physical asset endowments, we are embedding distributional issues within a more traditional growththeoretic framework. Indeed, the role of the return to capital, which is essential in that literature, has largely been ignored in the recent discussions of income inequality. The argument that the return to capital is essential to understanding distributional differences has, however, been addressed by Atkinson (2003) , and is supported by recent empirical evidence for the OECD (see Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2005) .
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 presents the structure of the model. Sections 3 and 4 derive the macroeconomic equilibrium and examine the determinants of the distributions of income and welfare. Section 5 analyzes the relationship between growth and inequality in response to specified structural changes. Section 6 supplements our theoretical analysis with some numerical simulations. Section 7 concludes, while technical details are provided in the Appendix.
Small open economy with heterogeneous agents and endogenous labor supply
We begin by setting out the structure of a small open economy. It is based on an endogenous growth model with elastic labor supply, where agents have heterogeneous income stemming from initial distributions of endowments of capital and of international bonds.
Technology and factor payments
The economy consists of a fixed number of firms indexed by j. The representative firm produces output using the production function
where K j denotes the individual firm's capital stock, L j denotes the individual firm's employment of labor, K is the average stock of capital in the economy, a proxy for the economy-wide stock of knowledge, so that L j K measures the efficiency units of labor. Production has the usual neoclassical properties of positive, but diminishing, marginal physical products and constant returns to scale in j K and L j K . This means that the production function has constant returns to scale both in the accumulating factors, j K and K , necessary for endogenous growth, and in the private factors j K and j L , necessary for marginal product factor pricing in a competitive equilibrium.
As all firms face identical production conditions, they choose the same level of employment and capital stock implying that K j = K and L j = L , for all j, where L is the average economy-wide level of employment. In equilibrium the economy-wide aggregate (average) production function can then be expressed as a linear function of the aggregate capital stock, as in Romer (1986) , namely
Assuming competitive factor markets, the wage rate and the return to capital are determined by their respective marginal physical products. Since the overall labor supply is assumed to be constant but the capital stock grows along with output, we see that the equilibrium wage rate increases with the 5 We assume that the production function satisfies the Inada conditions (0) 0, (0) ,
average stock of capital, while the return to capital does not:
Consumers
The economy is populated by a mass 1 of infinitely-lived consumers, indexed by i. Consumers have a unit of time that can be allocated to either leisure, l i or labor
Agents maximize lifetime utility, which depends on complementary consumption C i and leisure in the following iso-elastic form:
The parameter γ is related to the agent's inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, 1 (1 )
captures the relative importance of leisure to consumption; and β is the instantaneous subjective discount rate. The last two parameter restrictions in (3) ensure the concavity of the utility function with respect to C and l.
Agents accumulate capital subject to convex adjustment (installation) costs for any given change, I, of the capital stock. Specifically, we assume the adjustment costs to be proportional to the rate of investment per unit of installed capital, I/K, specified by the following quadratic function:
The complementarity instead of additive separability of consumption and leisure in the utility function preserves homogeneity and consistency with a balanced-growth equilibrium (see Turnovsky, 1999, and Ladron-de-Guevara, Ortigueira, and Santos, 1999) 7 The linear homogeneity of this cost function is necessary to sustain steady-state growth.
( , )
We assume that capital does not depreciate, so that agent i accumulates capital at the rate
Individuals also accumulate net foreign bonds, B i , which pay an exogenously given world interest rate, r, subject to the accumulation equation:
Consumer optimality conditions
The consumer chooses consumption, leisure, investment, and rates of capital and foreign bond accumulation to maximize (3) subject to the accumulation equations, (5) and (6). The corresponding first-order optimality conditions with respect to the first three decisions are:
where q i is agent i's shadow price of capital, normalized by her marginal utility of wealth, λ i .
The optimality conditions with respect to B i and K i yield the following arbitrage relationships:
Equation (8a) is the standard Keynes-Ramsey consumption rule equating the rate of return on consumption to the exogenous rate of return on foreign bonds. Since both r and β are constant, the marginal utility λ i grows at a constant rate. Equation (8b) equates the net rate of return on domestic capital -the sum of the flow return, capital gains, and benefits from reduced installation costs associated with the new investment and higher capital stock -to the return of the traded bond. In addition, the following transversality conditions must hold:
Aggregate labor market clearing condition implies:
Using this condition, asset returns, which we have expressed in terms of L, can equally well be written as functions of (1− l), namely
Macroeconomic equilibrium
From the optimality conditions, together with the individual's accumulation equation, and the corresponding conditions for the aggregate economy, we can derive the macroeconomic equilibrium,
showing that the economy is in fact always on its balanced growth path. Details of these derivations are provided in the Appendix A.1, where we show that the macroeconomic equilibrium is summarized by the pair of equations
As a consequence of the homogeneity of the utility function, the structure of this equilibrium is independent of any distributional characteristics. It comprises an autonomous pair of differential equations in the aggregate variables, q, l, and is similar to Turnovsky (1999) . Linearizing these equations around steady state we can show that the two eigenvalues are negative. Thus, in response to any structural change, q and l always jump so that the aggregate economy is always in steady state.
Setting 0 l q = = in (11a) and (11b), the aggregate equilibrium values of , , q l ψ are determined by
With ( ) l t being constant at all points of time, it then follows from (A.4) that ( ) i l t is also constant over time. In addition, the transversality condition (9a) implies r ψ > . Using (12a) and combining this the requirement that the equilibrium price be non-negative, imposes the constraints 8 0 1 q hr < < + or equivalently 1 r r h γ β γ − + > > Equation (12a) implies that the equilibrium growth rate is determined by the difference between the world interest rate and the rate of time preference multiplied by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Given this growth rate, this equation also determines the price of capital that ensures that the domestic capital stock will grow at this equilibrium rate. Having obtained q (12b) then determines the allocation of time to labor such that the rate of return on capital equals the given world interest rate.
3.
Distributions of wealth, income, and welfare
Distribution of wealth
We now turn to the distribution of wealth. With q constant over time and identical across 8 These restrictions hold under plausible conditions. They certainly hold if 0 γ < , i.e. if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than one, a condition that virtually all empirical studies confirm; see e.g. Guvenen (2006 
This definition shows that given asset endowments,
initial wealth is endogenously
determined in response to a structural change, through the response of q. Summing (13) and (13') over all agents, the corresponding aggregate quantities are, respectively 
where the transversality condition implies
Equations (15) (15a) is the crucial mechanism whereby the agent's initial relative wealth impacts on the distribution of income. Wealthier agents have a lower marginal utility of wealth.
They therefore choose to supply less labor and to "buy" more leisure. In effect, they compensate for their larger capital endowment, and the higher growth rate it would support, by providing less labor, thereby having an exactly offsetting effect on the growth rate, which is therefore independent of the distribution of capital.
Intertemporal viability
Each agent also needs to satisfy the transversality condition (9b), which in Appendix A.3
Combining this with (15a), this is equivalent to the aggregate viability condition
implying that the aggregate economy is viable if and only if each individual is intertemporally viable.
Combining (15b) and (16'), we see that the transversality condition, together with aggregate solvency, implies that the economy has net positive wealth, 0
Rewriting (16') in the form
it asserts that initial wealth plus the capitalized value of labor income must equal the capitalized value of consumption. Combining with (14') we obtain
Having determined the equilibrium values of , l q , (17) determines the combination of the initial capital stock, K 0 , and the initial stock of foreign bonds, B 0 , necessary for the equilibrium to be intertemporally viable. 9 If the inherited stocks of these assets violate (17), we assume that the government engages in an initial trade, described by dB 0 +˜ q dK 0 = 0 , to bring about the correct ratio.
Relative wealth and income
Using (13) and (14) 
Since individual and aggregate variables all share the same growth rates, we can express (18) in terms of the initial endowments: 
From (18') we see that a structural change that leads to a change in the equilibrium ratio of bonds to capital will in general have an effect on agent i's relative wealth. 
Combining these relationships we find
production must be less than the sum of consumption and the investment cost.
relatively more bonds than capital her relative wealth will rise. This in turn means that if the agent's wealth is above the average, wealth inequality will rise, while if it is below, it will fall. 
Using (18') and the equilibrium growth rate, this can be expressed in terms of the initial endowments ,0 ,0
where the respective contributions to relative income from bonds versus capital endowment are 
individual i will have above average wealth, but below average income. This is because with high adjustment costs (h >> 0), return from capital investment k r is driven down by arbitrage, which disadvantages wealth owners relative to labor.
Wealth and income inequality
Given the linearity of (18'), wealth inequality, as measured by the standard deviation of its 
Likewise, income inequality is given by an analogous measure 1/ 2 2 2 2 2 ,0 ,0 ,0
Expressed in this way we see that b Γ , b Ω are the contributions to wealth and income inequality arising from the initial heterogeneity of endowments in bonds, while the same apply to , 
In this case v σ is independent of any structural changes, while income inequality is less than wealth inequality. Substituting (17) into (23'), we can obtain the following 
Thus, inequality (25a) may occur if the adjustment cost term in (25b) is sufficiently large. In this case, we obtain a reversal in ranking for income from wealth, i.e. an individual having above average wealth will have below average income. With the agent having above (below) endowments in both assets this can be reconciled with (21) by observing that (25b) implies that the country is a net debtor.
Finally, if there no adjustment costs, 0 h = , and (25b) reduces to the transversality condition (15b).
Welfare Inequality
The structural approach allows us to compute individual welfare and to analyze its distribution. By definition, an agent's welfare equals the value of the inter-temporal utility function (3) evaluated along the equilibrium growth path. Substituting (A.1) into (3) and evaluating, the optimized utility for an agent starting with asset endowments, ,0 ,0 , i i K B can be expressed as
,0 0 0 0
The welfare of agent i relative to that of the individual with average wealth and therefore supplying average leisure, l , is
Now using (15a), we can express relative welfare in the form
Consider now two individuals having relative wealths 2 1 v v > . Individual 2 will have a higher mean income. The transversality condition (15b) implies that if γ > 0, then their relative welfares satisfy
However, in the latter case absolute welfare, as expressed by (26) is negative. Thus in either case, the better endowed agent will have the higher absolute level of welfare.
We can now compute a measure of welfare inequality. A natural metric for this is obtained 
Summary of equilibrium
As noted, the economy is always on its balanced growth path, which for convenience we may summarize as follows, highlighting its recursive structure:
Equilibrium growth rate
Equilibrium rates of return
Factor returns
where 0 0
In addition the following restrictions apply:
1.
The transversality condition implies r ψ > , and in turn is equivalent to (15a) 
Structural changes and growth-inequality tradeoffs
In Figs. 1 and 2 we illustrate the growth-inequality tradeoffs in response to three structural shocks: (i) an increase in productivity, A; (ii) an increase in savings generated by a reduction in the rate of time discount, β ; and (iii) an increase in the world interest rate, r. We consider two cases: (i) no adjustment costs, 0 h = , and (ii) positive adjustment costs. We also restrict ourselves to the case of a uniform initial asset endowment, ,0
No adjustment costs
Setting 0 h = , involves two modifications to the equilibrium laid out in (31). First, the rate of return to capital, ( ) k r l r = , is constant, implying that employment/leisure is determined by this equilibrium condition as well. Second, the absence of adjustment costs implies 1 q = .
The PP and RR lines in Fig.1 plot (31a) and (31b), respectively, with 0 h = in the latter.
Their point of intersection, A, determines the initial equilibrium growth rate. The locus FF relates the rate of return to capital to l, in accordance with (31c). Its concavity is a direct property of the production function. Given K r r = , the corresponding allocation of time to leisure is denoted by B.
The lower right quadrant plots income and welfare inequality by WY and WU, respectively, in both cases the (fixed) wealth inequality being normalized to 1 v σ = . These represent (31f) [after substituting for (31e)] and (31g) respectively and can be easily shown to have the indicated concavity properties. 10 The equilibrium income inequality depicted by D exceeds the welfare inequality, C, consistent with the formal properties derived earlier.
Increase in productivity A
A positive productivity shock is represented by an outward rotation in the FF locus to FF'.
The equilibrium growth rate remains unchanged and the enhanced productivity is enjoyed in the form of increased average leisure illustrated by the move from B to B'. The increase in leisure (decrease in labor supply) raises the wage rate, in response to which wealthier people take relatively more leisure [see (15a)]. Their relative labor income therefore declines. However, an increase in their relative interest income tends to offset this drop. As dictated by the intertemporal viability condition [see (17) or (31d)], the increase in the wage rate and the average consumption flow it generates requires an increase in the relative foreign bond holing. This is met by selling capital, and the resulting interest income tends to increase income inequality. Overall, this latter effect dominates, and income inequality increases from D to D'. Correspondingly, welfare inequality increases from C to C'. Overall, we see that a rise in productivity results in no growth effect, yet an increase in both income and welfare inequality.
Decrease in rate of time preference β
A decline in β is represented by a leftward shift in the PP curve to P'P' and a downward rotation in the WY curve to WY'. The equilibrium growth rate increases to A", while leisure remains unchanged at B, leaving welfare inequality also unchanged at C. The higher growth rate raises the capitalized value of the trade balance deficit, which requires an increase in bonds to finance [see (31d)], increasing income inequality from D to D". Under this scenario, a positive growth is accompanied with higher income inequality but no change in the distribution of welfare.
10 WU can be immediately shown to be concave. WY will be concave if and only if 0 r θψ + ≥ , which will hold except in extremes cases of contraction.
Increase in foreign interest rate, r
A rise in r shifts the RR curve upward to R'R', the PP leftward to P'P', and rotates WY downward to WY'. The shift in equilibrium from A to A"' implies an increase in both the equilibrium return to capital and in the growth rate. The higher return to capital is the result of an increase in labor supply, with the corresponding reduction in leisure from B to B"' having the additional effect of reducing welfare inequality from C to C"'. The new equilibrium level of income inequality is at D"'. While this is drawn in Fig. 1 as a reduction in inequality, whether D"' lies above or below D depends, in part, upon the elasticity of substitution in production, as we demonstrate Section 6. In short, an exogenous rise in the foreign interest rate enhances growth domestically, has an ambiguous effect on income inequality, yet tightens the welfare distribution.
Positive adjustment costs
The three examples above demonstrate that the growth-inequality tradeoff -whether positive, negative, or unrelated -depends crucially on the sources of the shocks and channels of transmission. Fig. 2 analyzes the same structural changes and illustrates the relevant equilibria under positive adjustment costs. The two main differences from Fig. 1 are that the RR curve now describes the quadratic locus (31b), and that the WY curve now commences from a value ( 1) 0 i y − < , in accordance with (25a). In order to satisfy the transversality condition, r ψ > , the intersection of the PP and RR curves in the NW quadrant must always be to the right of the dashed line. Thus the initial equilibrium growth rate and rate of return on capital is at A. Given that value of K r , B yields the corresponding equilibrium leisure, with C and D yielding the resulting welfare and income inequality. The three structural changes can be represented by shifts in the various curves as in Fig.   1 , and generally the same qualitative conclusions prevail.
Numerical Results
To obtain further insights into the growth-income inequality relationship we provide some numerical examples. To do so, we employ the aggregate equilibrium CES production function, Examination of the tables suggests the following pattern of numerical effects.
Increase in A
(1a) An increase in A will decrease (increase) wealth inequality if the endowment of capital is more (less) unequal than that of bonds. The sensitivity declines with the elasticity of substitution. This applies independently of adjustment costs.
(1b) An increase in A reduces the impact of capital stock inequality on income inequality, but increases the impact of bond inequality on income inequality. Overall, the latter effect is dominant, so that with uniform asset inequality ( ,0
, an increase in A raises income inequality. In all cases, the sensitivity declines with the elasticity of substitution and is independent of adjustment costs.
(1c) Since the growth rate is independent of A, there is no growth-inequality tradeoff.
6.2
Decrease in β (2a) In the absence of adjustment costs, a decrease in β will decrease (increase) wealth inequality if the endowment of capital is more (less) unequal than that of bonds. With adjustment costs, a decrease in β will increase (decrease) wealth inequality if the endowment of capital is more (less) unequal than that of bonds. In this case the adjustment costs give a reversal. The sensitivity declines with the elasticity of substitution.
(2b) In the absence of adjustment costs, a decrease in β always increases the impact of bond inequality and generally that of capital inequality on income inequality. In all cases, the sensitivity declines with the elasticity of substitution, and indeed for 1.2 ε ≥ a decrease in β causes the effect of capital inequality to decline. In all cases, the effect of bond inequality dominates so that with uniform inequality, an increase in A raises income inequality.
With adjustment costs, a decrease in β decreases the impact of bond inequality on income inequality for low values of ε , and increases it if ε is sufficiently large (certainly greater than unity). In all cases it increases the effect of capital inequality on income inequality. In all cases, the bond effect dominates, so that with uniform inequality, a decrease in β reduces income inequality for low values of ε and increases it as ε increases.
(2c) In most cases the increase in the growth rate resulting from a decrease in β is associated with an increase in income inequality, implying a positive growth-inequality tradeoff. But there are exceptions; for example if there are adjustment costs and the elasticity of substitution is low.
Increase in r
(3a) An increase in r will increase (decrease) wealth inequality if the endowment of capital is more (less) unequal than that of bonds. The sensitivity declines with the elasticity of substitution. For low values of ε , in the presence of adjustment costs, it causes the country to become an international debtor.
(3b) An increase in r increases the impact of capital inequality and decreases that of bond inequality on income inequality. In all cases, the effect of bond inequality dominates so that with uniform inequality, an increase in r reduces income inequality. The sensitivity declines with the elasticity of substitution.
(3c) To the extent that income inequality is due to heterogeneity of capital (bond) endowment, an increase in r generates a positive (negative) growth-income inequality In the presence of adjustment costs and tradeoff. In all cases the bond effect dominates, so that with uniform inequality, an increase in r generates a negative growth-inequality tradeoff.
Concluding comments
Despite intensive research effort, the relationship between growth and inequality remains largely unresolved. Empirical evidence is inconclusive, some studies finding these two variables to be negatively related, while others obtain a positive relationship. Upon reflection, the ambiguity of the empirical findings is not surprising when one considers that both variables are endogenous, so that their co-movements are likely to depend upon the underlying structural changes impinging on the economy.
The existing literature analyzes the growth-inequality relationship within a closed economy.
In this paper we have considered a small open economy which has access to a perfectly competitive world financial market. Output is produced by an AK technology and inequality is driven by agent heterogeneity, the particular form of which we consider pertains to the agents' initial endowments of capital and foreign bond holdings. The key mechanism whereby this initial distribution of capital endowments influences the distribution of income is through their differential wealth effects, and their impact on labor supply.
The extension to the small open economy enriches the potential growth-inequality tradeoffs from those of the corresponding closed economy. First, by impacting on the relative price of capital, to the extent that the relative endowments of capital differs from that of bonds, structural shocks will affect wealth inequality, as well as income inequality. Overall, whether a structural change is associated with a positive or negative growth-inequality tradeoff depends critically upon whether the underlying heterogeneity originates primarily with the initial endowment of bonds or with capital.
In this respect the ambiguity of our results contrasts with that of the analogous closed economy model, which tended to support a positive relationship between inequality and growth for most structural changes; García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2006) . But at the same time it is generally more consistent with the ambiguous relationships that characterize the existing empirical evidence.
Finally, we conclude with a caveat. While the simple AK model has the advantage of providing a tractable framework for highlighting the growth-inequality relationship, it also has the limitation that the economy is always on its balanced growth path. It therefore cannot address issues pertaining to the dynamics of wealth and income distribution. This is particularly important if one wishes to study the distributional aspects of foreign aid which clearly evolve gradually over time.
Building on the dynamic model of Turnovsky and García-Peñalosa (2008) , we believe that the approach developed in this paper can be adapted to provide a tractable framework for investigating this important issue. Aggregating (A.1) over the i agents, the following aggregate consumption-capital ratio is obtained:
We next consider the growth rate of the aggregate capital stock. Combining equation (7c) 
